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R E L AT I V I Z I N G T O K I N D S A N D FA C T S
A major part of what motivates the BSA is the “Humean Supervenience"
thesis, according to which “the whole truth about a world like ours”,
such as what the laws are, “supervenes on the spatiotemporal distri-
bution of local qualities” (Lewis 1994, p. 473). That supervenient base
for “the whole truth” of a world is called the Humean Mosaic (HM),
and the BSA may be summarized as saying that the laws of nature are
the axioms and theorems of the best systematization—the simplest and
strongest, on balance—of the (HM. Importantly, the systems that com-
pete to be the best in the BSA are not systematizations of the HM directly.
Rather, they are systematizations of the facts of the HM as expressed
using a privileged language.1 Recent variations on the BSA have paid
special attention to the role of the privileged language in identifying
laws (e.g.: Cohen and Callender 2009; Loewer 2007; Schrenk 2008). The
broad aim of this chapter is to (re-)direct some attention toward the
facts that are being systematized and their role in identifying the laws.
The more specific aim is to argue that the role for language(s) cham-
pioned by Cohen and Callender (2009) in their “Better Best Systems
Analysis” (BBSA) view should be extended to facts.2
According to the BBSA, laws are kind relative in the sense that differ-
ent sets of laws exist relative to every set of kinds that may be treated
as basic in the language used to express the laws (and competing sys-
tems and systematized facts). The extension I am proposing, dubbed
simply the “Kind and Fact Relative Analysis” view (KFRA), has laws de-
termined relative to the set of kinds treated as basic and the set of facts
to be systematized. The KFRA, by including the kind relativity of the
BBSA, can do all the same good work as the BBSA. Furthermore, I argue
that the fact relativity of the KFRA does a better job of answering two
new desiderata. The first desideratum calls for the regularities that ap-
pear in interfield interactions to be accommodated as laws. This depends,
1 Of course it cannot be that all facts about the HM are being systematized since it is presum-
ably a fact about the HM that particular regularities are laws, and we should not expect
every competing system to systematize those facts (on pain of trivializing the whole
analysis). What is being systematized are the basic facts of the HM, as determined by the
predicates treated as basic by the privileged language. Throughout this dissertation I
have spoken and will speak of “facts” in the sense of these basic facts.
2 Variations of the BBSA was developed independently in Schrenk (2008) and Cohen and
Callender (2009). I generally focus on the version of the view developed by the later
authors because of their explicit efforts to reconcile the BBSA with those of non-Humeans.
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at least in some cases, on there being a shared interest in some kind(s)
but not all the facts related to the shared kind(s). The second desidera-
tum calls for an egalitarian distinction between fundamental and special
science laws. Such a distinction provides metaphysically equal stand-
ing to fundamental and special science laws, while also allowing for
the distinction between them that exists in scientific practice.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, I introduce
the BBSA and its accommodation of special science laws. In Section 3.2,
I introduce the kind and fact relative KFRA, and discuss its ability to ac-
commodate special science laws in the same way as the BBSA. Section
3.3 is concerned with developing the interfield interactions desidera-
tum, and showing how it may be met by the KFRA but not the BBSA.
Section 3.4 is concerned with developing the desideratum of having an
egalitarian distinction between fundamental and special science laws,
and arguing that the KFRA captures features of the distinction that the
BBSA cannot. I conclude in Section 3.5 that anyone who endorses the
BBSA would do better by endorsing the KFRA, and there offer a sum-
mary of the chapter.
3.1 the better best systems analysis
It is helpful to start with a closer look at Lewis’ thoughts on facts and
languages in the BSA. Lewis took it to be that the privileged language
of the laws was the true fundamental language of “perfectly natural
properties” (Lewis 1983, p. 368). Assuming classical physics to be more
or less in the right when describing the fundamental nature of the
world (i.e. the HM), the facts of the HM as expressed in the fundamental
language are concerned with
spatiotemporal relations: distance relations, both spacelike
and timelike, and perhaps also occupancy relations between
point-sized things and spacetime points. And [...] local qual-
ities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties of points, or of
point-sized occupants of points.
(Lewis 1994, p. 474)
The Humean Supervenience thesis and Lewis’ particular characteriza-
tion of the HM have largely fallen out of favor, but that has not done
much harm to the general standing of the BSA.3 Authors since Lewis
3 Of particular relevance for this chapter, Cohen and Callender (2009) restrict their interest
in supervenience to kinds. And, while they do use the term “Humean mosaic”, it is not
the capital-H, capital-M, Humean Mosaic of Lewis, but rather the term for the various
sets of language-relative facts of the world—e.g., in comparing physics and ecology,
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have offered a number of BSA-style views of laws that depart from
Lewis’ version of the view in a variety of ways.
One such departure from Lewis’ BSA is the BBSA of Cohen and Cal-
lender (2009). According to the BBSA, a best system competition is run
for every language—as determined by the set of kinds4 treated as basic
in the language—that may be chosen to express the facts and system-
atizations of the world.5 In each competition, every competing system
is judged according to its expression in the privileged language. If S
is the best system when the privileged language treats the set of kinds
K as basic, then the theorems of S are the laws relative to K. This kind
relativity in the laws of the BBSA helps resolve several issues related
to language choice in the BSA.6 It also allows for the existence of laws
in the special sciences that are egalitarian primarily in the sense (to
be expanded upon below) that no one set of laws is dependent upon
any other set (e.g. the laws of biology don’t depend on the laws of
physics for their existence). These egalitarian special science laws are
part of an effort to reconcile “Non-Humean Pluralist” views like those
of Cartwright (1999) or Dupré (1993) with a Best Systems view of laws
(Callender and Cohen 2010). Advancing that effort, or at least preserv-
ing what has already been done, will be a largely backgrounded but
recurring theme in this chapter.
The idea at the heart of the BBSA’s egalitarian accommodation of
special science laws is this: If the law-directed interests of a field7 are
they speak of “two quite different mosaics” (Callender and Cohen 2010, p. 18). More
generally, the BSA is compatible with a rejection of Humean Supervenience, and such a
rejection has been a boon to the BSA since it frees the view from a host of extraneous
metaphysical commitments. See Loewer (1996) for a discussion of the problems with
Humean Supervenience and an explanation of how the BSA can survive despite them.
4 Where the possible sets of kinds are subsets of the set of the fundamental kinds and all
kinds that supervene on the fundamental kinds.
5 Like with Humean Supervenience, the HM comes with substantial metaphysical baggage.
So speaking of “facts of the HM” is dropped in favor of the more general “facts of the
world”. It is still the language determined basic facts, but what those might be does not
necessarily come with the commitments of the HM.
6 Cohen and Callender (2009) are explicitly motivated by three desiderata: epistemic accessi-
bility, immanent comparisons, and supervenient kind laws. Suffice it to say that I think Cohen
and Callender (2009) are right that the BBSA satisfies these three desiderata. Addition-
ally, it should not be hard to see if one reviews the relevant arguments in that paper that
they may all be run with little to no adjustment on behalf of the view introduced in this
chapter.
7 By “law-directed interests” I mean just those interests that correspond to the feature(s) of
the BSA to which the laws are relative. There are a lot of things that could be counted in
the interests of a field, but not all of them have to do with identifying the laws of the field.
For example, astronomers are interested in stars and planets and moons, and insofar as
those are kinds of interest, the BBSA would say they are among the law-directed interests
of astronomy. But astronomers might also be interested in moving from a funding model
dependent on a few large government funded international collaborations to a funding
model with more small projects supported by private industry. Strictly speaking, the
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captured by what kinds are treated as basic by the field, then the laws
of the field are the laws that are relative to the kinds treated as basic by
the field. For every set of kinds Ki, there are corresponding Ki-relative
laws Ri. If biologists are interested in the kinds Kbio, then the Kbio-
relative laws Rbio are the laws of biology. Similarly, if ecologists are
interested in kinds Keco, the laws Reco are the laws of ecology. And so
on, for every scientific field. There will also be lots of sets of kinds that
are not, and may never be, of any interest to anyone. There are still
laws for such sets of kinds, but they are just as (un)interesting as the
kinds to which they are relative.
That this provides egalitarian special science laws stems from two re-
lated ideas in Callender and Cohen (2010). The first is that the laws of
special sciences should have “autonomy” from the fundamental laws
(or the laws of any other field). Bridge principles (and the like) may
exist incidentally because two fields are closely related; e.g., because
of direct overlap in their basic kinds, or because of easy translation
between one set of kinds and the other. But that the laws of one set de-
serve the title of “law” cannot depend on the existence of any bridge
principles connecting the one set to any others (Callender and Cohen
2010, p. 439). The other idea relevant to the egalitarian nature of the
special science laws in the BBSA is an “ontological egalitarianism”, ac-
cording to which no ontological level enjoys any special status. The fun-
damental kinds are not, for example, more deserving of interest than
any other set of kinds from an ontological perspective. Of course, we
humans may care more about some kinds than others for any number
of reasons—the kinds of biology and economics are of great practical
importance to us, and curiosity may drive us to search for the funda-
mental kinds—but a truly disinterested observer should find no reason
to privilege one set over any other. Callender and Cohen (2010) relate
this to the “dappled world” picture of science in Cartwright (1999) that
encourages a preponderance of equal and more or less independent sci-
entific enterprises, and discourages stratification and any strained uni-
fication. However, while Cartwright is explicitly anti-fundamentalist,
Callender and Cohen are not; a thoroughgoing anti-fundamentalism
must be dropped on account of the fundamental kinds playing a role
in determining the set of all kinds for the BBSA.
The BBSA’s egalitarian special science laws are a great addition to the
BSA, but the precise implementation leaves something to be desired.
The success of the BBSA depends on a conditional: If the law-directed
interests of a field are captured by what kinds are treated as basic by
the field, then the laws of the field are the laws that are relative to
funding stuff might be a part of the interests of astronomy, but it’s not a part of the
law-directed interests of astronomy (at least not according to the BBSA and KFRA).
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the kinds treated as basic by the field. Going forward, I will challenge
the antecedent. The law-directed interests of a field are not captured
entirely by the kinds treated as basic by the field. Systems competing
to be the best are systematizations of the facts of the world as expressed
using a particular language. Once a language is chosen—as in the BBSA
by a choice of kinds—there is still room for a field to be interested
in only a subset of the facts of the world. What is important to the
individuation of fields and laws are the kinds treated as basic and the
set of matters of fact that are being systematized.
3.2 relativity to kinds and facts
What kinds are treated as basic—by the members of a scientific field,
or in the language in which a set of laws is expressed—is a matter
intimately related to what facts are relevant—as being of interest to
a field, or as part of what is actually being systematized by the laws.
Increasing the set of available kinds increases the set of expressible
facts, and limiting the set of available kinds limits the set of express-
ible facts. To illustrate with a very toy-like example, suppose for a
moment that the fundamental level of the world is just the arrange-
ment of atoms. The fundamental kinds include the atomic elements:
hydrogen, helium, lithium, beryllium, etc. The fundamental matters
of fact are concerned with the spatio-temporal arrangements of the
atomic elements: something like ‘there is helium at time t and position
p’. There can also be non-fundamental, supervenient, kinds: caffeine
is a certain arrangement of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen.
With the non-fundamental kinds comes the possibility of expressing
non-fundamental facts that describe the same state of affairs as the
fundamental facts, but in different terms: ‘there is caffeine at time t oc-
cupying position(s) P = {p1, p2, ...}’, where the pi in P are the positions
of the constituent atoms of the caffeine molecule.
In the direction of constraining the set of facts, we can see that a suit-
ably chosen set of kinds can make some facts, even under redescription,
wholly inaccessible. Consider a set of kinds that includes caffeine, but
not carbon. With such a set of kinds there are no strictly carbon related
matters of fact. But some carbon related matters of fact are recoverable
by way of the caffeine facts and additional principles of translation
having to do with the relation between caffeine and carbon. However,
not all carbon related matters of fact may be recoverable; e.g., if a set
of kinds doesn’t include carbon and it doesn’t include graphite (and
it doesn’t include pencils or any other kinds involving graphite), then
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those carbon related matters of fact involved in graphite related mat-
ters of fact are both inexpressible and unrecoverable.
The fact relativity provided by kind relativity is incomplete. There
are all the carbon related matters of fact, and as subsets of those there
are the caffeine and graphite related carbon facts. The kind carbon may
be of interest to members of the Department of Coffee Chemistry and
the Department of Pencil Chemistry. But (presumably) coffee chemists
only care about caffeine related carbon facts, and pencil chemists only
care about graphite related carbon facts. However, once committed to
having carbon as a kind, nothing short of fact relativity will allow the
coffee chemists (or pencil chemists) to ignore the carbon facts related to
graphite (or caffeine). This might be overcome somewhat by employ-
ing gerrymandered supervenient kinds—in our example they might
be ‘coffee carbon’ and ‘pencil carbon’—but then, strictly speaking, the
respective fields are not both interested in the same kind—namely, car-
bon—and that will be a problem if the two fields try to interact over
their shared interest.8
The BBSA must be extended with fact relativity if it is to accommo-
date the possibility that two fields treat some of the same kinds as
basic while differing in what facts related to those shared kinds are of
interest to them. That is a big if, but it will become central to the issue
of accommodating interfield interactions in Section 3.3. And, as will be
seen in Section 3.4’s discussion of distinguishing between fundamen-
tal and special science laws, this is not the only reason to admit fact
relativity. With all that being said, let us extend the BBSA into the Kind
and Fact Relative Analysis (KFRA).
In the BBSA, there is the set of all kinds K and its subsets Ki. A best
system competition is run for every Ki, and all competing systems in
the Ki competition are expressed with the kinds of Ki as the basic kinds.
A regularity is a law (according to the BBSA) relative to Ki if it appears
in the best system of the Ki competition. The KFRA adds to this the
set of all facts F (that are expressible when the available kinds are the
whole of K) and its subsets Fj. A best system competition is run for
every (Ki, Fj), where Fj provides the set of facts to be systematized and
Ki is the set of kinds treated as basic in the language in which all facts
and competing systems are expressed. For every such competition the
best system provides the (Ki, Fj)-relative laws Ri,j.
The KFRA allows for egalitarian special science laws in a manner
structurally the same as in the BBSA. If the interests of a field are cap-
tured by what kinds are treated as basic and what facts are intended to
be systematized by the field, then the laws of the field are the laws that
8 This issue of gerrymandered kinds will come get a fuller treatment in Section 3.3.3,
where the concern is specifically with interfield interactions.
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are relative to the kinds treated as basic and the facts intended to be sys-
tematized by the field. If biologists are interested in the kinds Kbio and
systematizing the facts Fbio, then the (Kbio, Fbio)-relative laws Rbio,bio
are the laws of biology. If ecologists are are interested in kinds Keco
and systematizing the facts Feco, the laws Reco,eco are the laws of ecol-
ogy. And so on.
The special science laws of the BBSA are all a special case of the KFRA
where the set of facts to be systematized is always the set of all facts
F . Insofar as we were happy with the treatment of special science laws
by the BBSA, we may assume by default that the fact set of interest
is F . Thus, laws of biology are the (Kbio,F )-relative laws Rbio,F , the
laws of ecology are the (Keco,F )-relative laws Reco,F , etc. What the
KFRA allows for beyond the BBSA is the possibility that the law-directed
interests of biology, ecology, or any other field, involve being interested
in only some proper subset of all the matters of fact.
3.3 interfield interactions
Interfield interactions, as a group and individually, are an important
test case for the BBSA (and, by extension, the KFRA). The egalitarianism
of Callender and Cohen should require that laws resulting from inter-
field interactions be located somewhere with the same status as the
laws of any one field.
Darden and Maull nicely describe interfield interactions as occurring
when
fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the
same phenomenon, and when questions arise about that
phenomenon within a field which cannot be answered with
the techniques and concepts of that field.
(Darden and Maull 1977, p. 50)
The existence of such interfield interactions blurs the boundaries be-
tween fields. With blurred boundaries come unclear interests, and with
that comes unclear laws. Something should be said to clear things up.
Callender and Cohen write:
Why do the rabbits fall down rather than up? Why do the
rabbits’ speeds attain a maximum value where they do?
These are questions with answers in physics and physiol-
ogy, but (we assume) no answer in the Best System crafted
from ecological kinds.
(Callender and Cohen 2010, p. 444)
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These questions are assumed to have no answer in the ecological laws
because the kinds relevant to their explanantia are not ecological kinds,
but rather physical and physiological kinds. But then we should also
not assume that these questions have answers in physics and physiol-
ogy, because the kinds relevant to their explananda (e.g., rabbits) are
not physical or physiological kinds. However, these questions must
have answers somewhere. Some field must be interested in the relevant
kinds of physics, physiology, and ecology. The field may be one of
those just named, or it may be an entirely new field that arises ex-
clusively for capturing the particular interfield interaction. Either way,
interfield interactions (and their resultant laws) should be accommo-
dated by views like the BBSA and KFRA on account of their egalitarian-
ism. I will refer to this call for accommodation as the interfield interac-
tion desideratum.
Going forward in this section, I begin by offering a concrete case
of interfield interaction from Barlow (1952) that involves blurring the
boundaries between biology and physics on account of how the behav-
ior of photons influences the structure of insect eyes. Following that, I
argue against the ability of the BBSA to make sense of Barlow’s work.
My argument, in brief, will be this: The best system of physics, espe-
cially the relevant fragment of it concerned exclusively with just some
of the behavior of photons, is very strong and simple compared to
the best system of biology. The consequence of this is that when the
BBSA tries to locate a field for Barlow’s work that has interests in both
physics and biology, systems containing the physical laws will tend to
outcompete systems containing the biological laws, and the “best” sys-
tem will fail to include all the laws relevant to the interfield interaction.
The KFRA, considered following the BBSA, need not suffer from such an
outcompeting problem. Biology, if that is where Barlow’s work is to be
located, surely is interested in photons as a kind, but it is interested
in only a small subset of photon related facts. The strength that comes
with the relevant physical laws can be greatly reduced by disregarding,
by way of the KFRA’s fact relativity, the physical facts that are irrelevant
to Barlow’s work. In this way the KFRA can succeed at making sense of
interfield interactions when the BBSA fails.
3.3.1 Barlow, Between Biology and Physics
Barlow (1952), “The Size of Ommatidia in Apposition Eyes”, published
in The Journal of Experimental Biology, begins not so much with biology
as physics: Think of an insect’s compound eye as a simple sphere of
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lenses each in front of a single photoreceptor.9 The more lenses (and
associated photoreceptors) there are, the higher the resolution of the
image that may be generated. The smaller the lenses are, the blurrier
the image becomes as a result of diffraction and as a function of the
wavelength of the incoming light.
For a given sized eye sphere, and photoreceptors sensitive to a par-
ticular wavelength of light, there is a physical limit on the resolution of
the image available to an insect. This is because more lenses increases
the resolution, but more lenses also results in smaller lenses (since
the size of the sphere is fixed) and smaller lenses decreases resolution.
Barlow calculated this limit, proceeded to the Cambridge Museum of
Zoology, measured the eye sphere and lens sizes of 27 species of insect
in the collection, and found that those sizes were approximately those
that would be predicted if we supposed that the resolution of insect
eyes was at the physical limit. Barlow’s discussion of actual compound
eyes concludes that
the way in which ommatidial size and inter-ommatidial an-
gle are adjusted in eyes of different sizes suggests strongly
that the wave structure of light is the limiting factor in the
design of the compound eye.
(Barlow 1952, p. 672)
Underwriting this conclusion is what I will call Barlow’s regularity:
in [compound apposition] eyes of different sizes the num-
ber of ommatidia is adjusted so that inter-ommatidial angle
is just below the limiting resolving power of the ommatidia
(Barlow 1952, p. 674).
Because it contributes to an explanation of the conclusion of the paper,
Barlow’s regularity deserves the status of a law in the BBSA and KFRA.
Answering the interfield interaction desideratum will require us to
say in which set of laws Barlow’s regularity should be located. Barlow’s
regularity might be a law of physics or a law biology (to focus on
the two most salient extant fields). There is also an important third
possibility to consider. Regularities sourced to interfield interactions
may belong to their own field and set of laws, distinct from, but of
course related to, the interacting fields. So, not only could we locate
Barlow’s regularity among the laws of physics or biology, we could
9 An ommatidium is a segment of a compound eye including the lens, photoreceptor(s),
and various support structures. Actual ommatidia typically have more than one photore-
ceptor, but the number is at least on the order of one, as opposed to vertebrate eyes like
our own that can have millions behind a single lens.
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also locate it among the laws of a new field constructed, so to speak,
just for Barlow’s work.
Also, it is not just Barlow’s regularity that has to be located in a set of
laws. Barlow’s concluding remark goes beyond the regularity itself and
relates “the wave structure of light” to “the design of the compound
eye”. To do justice to Barlow’s work will require the locating of a set
of laws that contains all of (1) Barlow’s regularity, (2) the physical laws
relevant to “the wave structure of light”, and (3) the biological laws
relevant to “the design of the compound eye”.10 So, if we try to locate
Barlow’s regularity in the laws of physics, we must find some way of
introducing the biological laws of (3) into the laws of physics. If we try
to locate Barlow’s regularity in the laws of biology, we must introduce
the physical laws of (2) into the laws of biology. And, if we try to locate
Barlow’s regularity in some alternative set of laws, we must ensure that
the physical laws of (2) and the biological laws of (3) can coexist in the
alternative set.
Such is the sketch of what the the BBSA and KFRA must do to satisfy
the desideratum of interfield interactions. With that done, we can now
discuss in detail how the BBSA runs into trouble with Barlow’s work
and how the KFRA succeeds.
3.3.2 Interfield Interactions and the BBSA
What varies from one set of laws to the next in the BBSA is the set of
kinds that are treated as basic. The laws Rphys are the laws of physics
because they are the laws of the system that is best when all competing
systems are expressed using the language with basic kinds Kphys, and
the kinds Kphys are the kinds treated as basic by the field of physics.
The laws Rbio and kinds Kbio of biology are similarly related. Locat-
ing Barlow’s regularity for the BBSA will be a matter of finding one set
of kinds with the relevant physical kinds and the relevant biological
kinds. And that set of kinds must yield a set of laws that includes Bar-
low’s regularity, the relevant physical laws, and the relevant biological
laws.
10 As I will use the terms, being a physical (or biological) law (or kind, or fact, or what have
you) is to be a law (kind, fact, etc.) that is typically a law of physics (or of biology). (I
do not want to be saying anything about what it means to be “physical” in any broader
sense.) A law (kind, fact, etc.) is a law (...) “of physics” (or “of biology”) just in case it
is actually among the laws of the best system determined relative to kinds (and facts)
of interest to physics (or biology) So, if Barlow’s regularity is located in physics, then it
will be a law of physics, but it is not a physical law, since it is not a law that we typically
think of as appearing among the laws of physics. If the relevant biological laws are also
located in the laws of physics, then those laws may be called biological laws and laws of
physics, since they are typically found in the laws of biology, but here they are found in
the laws of physics.
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There are three sets of kinds that are likely to do the work we need.
The kinds of physics might be expanded to include the needed biolog-
ical kinds, like ‘ommatidia’. The kinds of biology might be expanded
to include the needed physical kinds, like ‘photons’. And there could
be a third set of kinds that includes what is needed, and nothing more,
from both the biological and physical kinds.
Consider expanding the kinds of biology first. There are the biologi-
cal kinds Kbio. And there is the system Sbio that has as its axioms and
theorems exactly the biological laws. According to the BBSA, it should
be that Sbio is the best system relative to Kbio.11 Assume that the only
needed physical kind is ‘photon’, or kp. Now consider the candidate
systems when the kinds are Kbio ∪ {kp}. We do not want Sbio to persist
as the best system, since then the laws of biology would not include
Barlow’s regularity or the needed physical laws. And we should not
expect Sbio to persist as the best system.
I take it to be a commonsensical feature of strength that (roughly),
other things being equal between systems S1 and S2, if S2 is silent
on more facts than S1, S1 is stronger than S2. In the typical biology
situation with just the basic kinds Kbio, every system was forced to
be silent on the photon related matters of fact, and so any weakness
resulting from that silence was irrelevant. But now, with kp included in
the set of basic kinds, not all systems must be silent on the photon facts.
A newly available system, Sbio+p, which covers all the facts that Sbio
does plus the photon facts, will be much stronger than Sbio (since there
are a lot of photon facts). Sbio+p should only be slightly less simple than
Sbio, since, relative to the overall complexity of biology, the complexity
required to cover the photon facts should be small.
Regarding this comparison of simplicity: I take it to be a common-
sensical feature of simplicity that (roughly), other things being equal
between systems S1 and S2, if S1 requires employing fewer basic kinds
than S2, then S1 is simpler than S2. Sbio+p requires one basic kind more
than Sbio, and that would be, considering the many kinds presumably
in Kbio, a pretty minimal loss of simplicity when all else is equal. But
surely not all other things are equal between Sbio and Sbio+p, so that
feature of simplicity only gets us so far. What I really have in mind
when suggesting that “relative to the overall complexity of biology, the
complexity required to cover the photon facts should be small” is some-
11 Note that the subscript to a system refers to what is being successfully systematized,
and need not match, in general, the subscript on the relevant kinds. In the competition
to determine the best system relative to the kinds Kbio, Sbio is a candidate system (as
well as the best). Another candidate system might be named Sbio+X, which is a system
that has all the biological laws, plus the laws of X. If Sbio was not defined in a way that
guarantees its victory, then it would be reasonable to consider the possibility of Sbio+X
being the best system relative to Kbio,
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thing like the contrast between Maxwell’s equations and the enormous
map being developed, as in Thiele et al. (2013), just to cover the small
slice of biology that is human metabolism.12
Now, we might assume that Sbio+p is the system we need, in that it
yields as laws the needed biological laws, the needed physical laws,
and Barlow’s regularity. But, even if that is true, the difficulty is we
should not expect Sbio+p to be the best system. Consider another sys-
tem, Sp, that covers only the photon facts, and none of the biological
kind related matters of fact. Certainly this system will be very sim-
ple compared to Sbio+p. And Sp should not be that much weaker than
Sbio+p, for, even though Sp doesn’t cover any of the biological facts,
there are a lot more photon facts than there are biological facts. Both
Sbio+p and Sp are a lot stronger than Sbio, but while Sbio+p is a bit less
simple, Sp is a lot simpler. On balance, it seems likely that Sp will be
the better system relative to the set of kinds Kbio ∪ {kp}.
One might object, or at least worry, about my claim that “there are
a lot more photon facts than there are biological facts”. I assuage the
worried first: The stars in the observable universe release on the order
1067 photons per second.13 In contrast, there are about 1037 basepairs
of DNA on Earth (Landenmark, Forgan, and Cockell 2015). For the
number of biological facts to get close to the number of facts related to
photons originating from stars, there would need to be (assuming the
DNA base-pair count is the high end for numbers of facts concerned
with any particular biological kind) 1030 biological kinds each with a
number of associated facts comparable to the count of base pairs of
DNA on Earth. For example, base pairs of RNA might fit the bill, but
that is just one kind of the one thousand billion billion billion that are
12 Someone might object on the grounds that the simplicity of Maxwell’s equations is an il-
lusion because, as Cartwright puts it, “a multitude of highly complicated unknown laws
must be assumed to save Maxwell” when applying the theory (Cartwright 1999, p. 155). I
am not worried about this is because, roughly speaking, Cartwright’s objection depends
on trying to apply Maxwell’s equations in many circumstances. If someone thinks that
Maxwell’s equations may be applied to any non-physics kinds (like the radiometers in
Cartwright’s example), then I am inclined to join Cartwright and think that the relevant
(best) system will have to be a lot more complicated than the inclusion of Maxwell’s
equations would appear to make it at first glance. However, in the BBSA (and KFRA),
relativizing means that the complex baggage that comes with Maxwell’s equations is
limited by the kinds (and facts) to which a best system competition is relative. Barlow
doesn’t employ “a multitude of highly complicated unknown laws” when applying what
physics he does to biology, which suggests that such a multitude is not required in this
case.
13 The Sun has an energy output of approximately 4× 1026 J/s, and photons in the visible
spectrum (which is most of what is released by the sun) have an energy of approximately
4× 10−19 J. So, roughly, the Sun releases 1045 photons per second. The number of stars
estimated to be in the observable universe is on the order of 1022. Assuming the Sun is
an average star, that makes for 1045 × 1022 = 1067 photons per second from all the stars
in the observable universe.
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needed. While there are surely a lot biological facts, there are a lot more
photon facts.
Now one might object, and justifiably so, that this is only one way
of individuating the relevant facts, and other ways—especially if they
don’t involve counting individual photons—will not result in there be-
ing vastly more photon facts than biological facts. It’s absolutely right
that there are other ways of individuating the relevant facts, and surely
among those are ones that attribute more facts to biology than photons.
But I do not think those ways of individuating will comport with sci-
entific practice. Our understanding of photon diffraction through a slit
(which is central to the physics relevant Barlow’s work) involves mea-
suring the trajectory deviations of individual photons. And, more on
the side of the relevant biology, eyes are actually sensitive to individual
photons (Rieke and Baylor 1998). There may be ways of individuating
the facts that are problematic for my argument, but the burden is on
the objector to identify one and argue that it better matches how the
facts are individuated in practice.
To summarize: The introduction of the needed physical kinds into
the set of biological kinds leads, because of their preponderance and
relative simplicity, to the physical kinds and laws outcompeting the bio-
logical kinds and laws. The result will be a set of laws for biology that
do not at all resemble the biological laws. Of particular significance,
the needed biological laws will not appear in the laws of biology. Nor
should we expect Barlow’s regularity to appear in the laws of biology.
Because of this outcompeting, the BBSA cannot accommodate the in-
terfield interaction exemplified by Barlow’s work by introducing the
relevant physical kinds into the kinds of biology.
The same problems arise for the BBSA if it tries to accommodate Bar-
low’s work by introducing biological kinds into physics or by collecting
all the relevant kinds into a new field. In the latter case the problem
is exactly the same as when introducing physical kinds into biology,
but with just the needed biological kinds being weighed against the
needed physical kinds. With even fewer biological kinds being consid-
ered, the physical kinds (and related facts and laws) are even more
likely to outcompete their biological counterparts. In the former case,
the biological kinds will never get a foothold in the best system relative
to the now-expanded set of physics kinds, since the gains in strength
will be small compared to the losses in simplicity.
Ommatidia are rare and complicated, and while that shouldn’t un-
dermine our interest in them, it does undermine their relevance when
our interests also include every photon in the world.
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3.3.3 Interfield Interactions and the KFRA
Let us consider again how we might include Barlow’s work in the laws
of biology, but this time with the KFRA as our view of laws.
Photons as a kind are undoubtedly of interest to biologists; beyond
their role in Barlow’s work, they are relevant to the study of vision
more generally, photosynthesis, bioluminescence, camouflage, color-
ation, and more. With the all-or-nothing fact relativity provided by
kind relativity, every photon related fact is the concern of biology,
whether it is related to anything remotely biological or not. But not
all photon facts are of interest to biologists. The photon facts of inter-
est to biologists are the ones that are near to biological facts. Biologists
will care to systematize the facts related to photons that interact with
eyes, leaves, skin, and scales. But the vast majority of photon related
facts—whose relevant photons never interact with anything biological,
or which might only be of interest to biology for their role in higher
level processes like heat exchange—are ones biologists will want to
ignore.
The KFRA, because it allows for there to be laws relativized to any
subset of the facts of the world, can exploit biology’s particular in-
terests in facts. In the typical biology situation, the laws of biology
Rbio,bio are those taken from the best system relative to the biological
facts Fbio and biological kinds Kbio. As was tried with the BBSA, the
KFRA can add the relevant physics kinds—i.e., photons, kp—to the set
of kinds of biology. Doing that, the laws of biology are the laws relative
to (Kbio ∪ {kp}, Fbio). If we assume, as the BBSA does, that Fbio just is
the set of all facts, then the same outcompeting problem will arise for
the KFRA as arises for the BBSA.
But we need not assume that Fbio is the set of all facts. Fbio is sup-
posed to correspond to just those facts that are of interest to biologists.
So exclude from the set of facts Fbio any physical facts that are irrel-
evant to biology, while including all those that are relevant. Since all
the relevant physical facts (i.e. the photon facts) that appear among
the facts of biology will be associated with some biological fact(s), the
strength gained by a system for covering the included photon facts
should not be enormous relative to the strength gains associated with
covering the biological facts. The system Sp, which covers all the pho-
ton facts and none of the biological facts, was problematic for the BBSA
because it was overwhelmingly strong and simple. On the KFRA, since
the set of facts being systematized includes only the biologically rel-
evant photon facts, Sp’s covering “all” the photons facts just means
that it covers all the biologically relevant photon facts, which are, pre-
sumably, not large in number compared to all the biological facts. The
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result is that Sp does not benefit from overwhelming strength, and so
it is unlikely to be the best system of biology. Without Sp to outcom-
pete it, the way is clear for Sbio+p, the system assumed to satisfy all the
requirements of accommodating Barlow’s work, to be the best system
of biology according to the KFRA.
If anything, the risk of outcompeting runs the other way for the KFRA
compared to the BBSA. Relative to the biological facts, there might not
be enough included photon facts to make the gains in strength worth
the losses in simplicity for a system that includes the needed physical
laws and Barlow’s regularity. In the face of such a worry, looking to a
third field (not biology and not physics), the interests of which include
only the biological and physical facts relevant to Barlow’s work, seems
like an attractive option. In this third field, the strength to be gained
for a system by including the needed physical laws that cover the phys-
ical facts will be more in balance with the strength to be gained from
including the biological laws that cover the biological facts. And the
relative strength gains of including Barlow’s regularity in a system go
up because the regularity covers a higher fraction of the facts being sys-
tematized. We can thus be more confident then before (when Barlow’s
work was being located in biology) in saying that the KFRA allows for a
set of laws—determined relative to the union of the relevant biological
and physical kinds and facts—that includes Barlow’s regularity and
the biological and physical laws relevant Barlow’s work. Locating Bar-
low’s work in its own field has the further benefit of fitting better into
the Cartwright-style “dappled world” view by avoiding unification.
Given what has just been said on behalf of the KFRA, one might be
inclined towards the following defense of the BBSA’s ability to accom-
modate Barlow’s work and interfield interactions in general. The prob-
lems with the all-or-nothing sort of fact relativity provided by kind
relativity can be eliminated by moving to gerrymandered kinds. For
example, consider the kind bio-photon that is associated with just the
photon facts that are biologically interesting. If the set of basic kinds
for biology, or the particular Barlow field, includes bio-photon (instead
of photon), then there isn’t the glut of photon facts that made Sp over-
whelmingly strong, and the BBSA will succeed at accommodating Bar-
low’s work as well as the KFRA. This may be correct, strictly speaking,
but I will insist that Barlow and biologists are not interested in bio-
photons. Barlow and biologists are interested (at least in part) in the
same kinds as physicists, and that shared interest is essential to Bar-
low’s work being an example of interfield interaction. Furthermore, if
it is bio-photon that is taken as the basic kind, then there will be no
physical laws, which refer to photons, to be had in the laws of biology
or the Barlow field, but only mimics that refer to bio-photons. So, while
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the BBSA may exploit gerrymandered kinds to accomplish something
like the fine-grained fact relativity of the KFRA, it can do so only at the
cost of breaking the points of shared interest (i.e. the kinds and laws)
that make interfield interactions truly interfield.
3.4 fundamental laws
A distinctive feature of the BBSA’s (and by extension the KFRA’s) ac-
commodation of special science laws is that it is egalitarian; it confers
equal metaphysical status upon the laws of all fields. But being egalitar-
ian does not require abolishing worthwhile distinctions. For example,
while Callender and Cohen are “ontological egalitarians” about kinds,
they must retain a distinction between the fundamental and superve-
nient kinds. The egalitarianism comes from that fact that, while the
fundamental and supervenient kinds may be distinguishable, the fun-
damental kinds (or any other set of kinds) are not treated as having
any status over that of any other set of kinds.
A similar sentiment may be directed towards laws. There are the
fundamental laws and the special science laws, and while they may be
distinguishable, the fundamental laws should not be treated as having
any privileged status. One might wonder why, if fundamental laws are
not to be treated as having any special status, we should bother to even
furnish some laws with the title “fundamental”. The reason to do so is
because such a distinction is present in scientific practice.
Part of what motivates the development of an analysis of laws of
nature is the desire for a better understanding of scientific practice.
As discussed in the preceding chapters, this is especially true among
proponents of the BSA (and its variants) who—despite regular admon-
ishment for having a view of laws that is too beholden to the pecu-
liarities of actual human science (as in: Armstrong 1983; Carroll 1990;
van Fraassen 1989)—celebrate each opportunity to have their view par-
allel actual human science (as in: Cohen and Callender 2009; Lewis
1983; Loewer 2007). There clearly are scientists looking for fundamen-
tal laws (e.g., in their own ways: Anderson 1972; Weinberg 1992). Even
a staunch anti-fundamentalist like Cartwright recognizes that “there is
a tendency to think that all facts must belong to one grand scheme”
(Cartwright 1999, p. 25). The existence of such a tendency, and a desire
to parallel scientific practice, should be enough to make any proponent
of the BSA (or its variants) interested in distinguishing fundamental
laws from special science laws. To that end I propose a desideratum
for an egalitarian distinction between fundamental and special science
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laws: No more or less respect should be paid to either fundamental or
special science laws, but respect should be paid to their being distinct.
To illustrate the challenge that this poses, recall that part of the egal-
itarianism of the BBSA was that no set of laws depends for its exis-
tence on the existence of any other laws. The standard way to violate
this requirement is to have special science laws be derivative of fun-
damental laws. It is easy to avoid this if there simply are no laws
marked as fundamental for other laws to depend upon. But as soon
as one makes the distinction between fundamental and special science
laws, it is compelling to think that the fundamental laws are somehow
more important, be that metaphysically, or in the practice of science,
or both. Maybe that presumed importance has to do with the exis-
tential dependence already mentioned. Maybe it’s that an explanation
that appeals to fundamental laws is better than one that appeals to
non-fundamental laws. Or maybe fundamental laws are more impor-
tant when it comes to thinking about scientific realism. I say that we
should pay equal respect to fundamental and special science laws pri-
marily in the sense that we should resist the compulsion to equate the
fundamentality of some laws with their importance. In some contexts
it may turn out that the fundamental laws are more important than spe-
cial science laws—and vice versa in other contexts—but that inequality
should be a consequence of considerations that go beyond our analysis
of laws.
For both the BBSA and KFRA, we may approach the fundamental laws
as we do the laws of any field. Just as the laws of biology are the
laws determined relative to the interest of biologists, the fundamental
laws are the laws relative to the interests of those scientists seeking
fundamental laws. It is this similar treatment that contributes to the
distinction being egalitarian.
The challenge for the BBSA is to identify the set of kinds of interest
to fundamental science. Similarly, for the KFRA, it will be a matter of
identifying the set of kinds and the set of facts of interest to fundamen-
tal science. I argue below (in Section 3.4.1) that the defining interest
of fundamental science is an interest in systematizing all facts, while
special sciences are interested in a proper subset of the facts. This is
apparent from the literature on ceteris paribus laws, as well as from the
often self-described aim of fundamental physicists being a “theory of
everything”. The BBSA, without fact relativity, cannot capture this crit-
ical difference in interests between fundamental and special sciences.
But kind relativity is still an issue for the KFRA, and so I consider (in
Section 3.4.2) a couple of strategies for picking out the set of kinds to
which the fundamental laws are relative.
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3.4.1 Fundamental Laws and Fact Relativity
The standard characterization of the distinction between fundamental
and special science laws is this: Fundamental laws are universal, excep-
tionless, regularities. Special science laws are non-universal, exception-
having, regularities, characterized by ceteris paribus (“all else being
equal”, “CP” for short) clauses. That special science laws are so charac-
terized is on display in a recent special issue of Erkenntnis on CP laws.
It is noted in the introduction to that issue that
there seems to be broad agreement that the special sciences
include non-universal generalizations ... The main motiva-
tion for accounts of CP laws seems to lie in the fact that
these accounts should also be plausible for special science
laws.
In fact, all authors of the special issue take this motivation
as their starting point for CP laws.
(Reutlinger and Unterhuber 2014, p. 1708)
While the connection between special science and CP laws is gen-
erally agreed upon, the connection between fundamental and excep-
tionless laws is more contentious. Led by Cartwright (1983), a number
of authors have argued that fundamental laws do, in fact, have excep-
tions.14 But such exceptions need not infect the interests of fundamental
science. A common line in contemporary fundamental physics is that
the goal is to find “the theory of everything”, a phrase that first ap-
pears in Ellis (1986). And, as noted earlier, even Cartwright recognizes
the fundamentalist’s “tendency to think that all facts must belong to
one grand scheme” (Cartwright 1999, p. 25). Whether or not the funda-
mental laws actually are exceptionless may be set aside here. For our
purposes it is enough if, insofar as there are scientists looking for fun-
damental laws, they are looking for a theory of everything. Cartwright
can be right that the fundamentalist idea of a “grand scheme” is a bad
one. There may be very good reasons for being more interested in the
non-fundamental areas of science than in fundamental science. But fun-
damental science is still a part of science, and Cartwright’s characteri-
zation of the fundamentalist idea fits well with a “theory of everything”
view of the interests of fundamental science. This attitude towards the
fundamental laws (not Cartwright’s, but the openness to Cartwright’s)
is part and parcel of the distinction between fundamental and special
science laws being egalitarian. The fundamental laws do not have any
14 See also: Cartwright (2002), Hüttemann (2014), and Pemberton and Cartwright (2014).
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special status; they are simply the laws of the system that is best rela-
tive to the interests of those scientists seeking fundamental laws.
So, as far as fact relativity is concerned, the distinction between fun-
damental and special science laws is clear. The fundamental laws are
those that attempt, or are intended by their seekers, to be exception-
less. Special science laws are not exceptionless, do not attempt to be,
and are not intended to be by their seekers. To be more precise for the
KFRA: The laws of a system are fundamental only if that system is the
best system relative to the set of all facts F . The laws of a system are
special science laws if that system is best relative to some F ⊂ F . The
question of to which set of kinds the fundamental laws are relative will
be considered later in this section.
The objection (from Cartwright and others, noted above) to the ex-
ceptionlessness of fundamental laws already has a response in the lit-
erature on the BSA, and it seems worthwhile to sketch how what I
have just said relates to that work. Several authors (Braddon-Mitchell
2001; Schrenk 2008, 2014; Unterhuber 2014) argue for various ways
that laws (possibly fundamental) with exceptions may appear in the
BSA (or its variants) when the introduction of such laws comes with
gains in simplicity greater than the assured losses in strength. Such
exceptions—call them simple system exceptions—are different from the
sort of exceptions on offer by the fact relativity of the KFRA—call them
fact relative exceptions. This difference is clear from the fact that sim-
ple system exceptions are available to any variant of the BSA, while
fact relative exceptions require fact relativity. If there are exceptions in
the laws sought by those seeking fundamental laws, they may be cap-
tured in the KFRA by simple system exceptions. But, to reiterate, these
exceptions need not undermine the distinction between fundamental—
as exceptionless—and special science—as exception-having—laws, be-
cause the fundamental laws are still the laws of the best system relative
to all facts—without exception!—and special science laws are those rel-
ative to only some proper subset of the facts.
The relationship between fact relative laws and CP laws likely war-
rants attention beyond what may be provided here. For the moment it
is enough that the all facts strategy is satisfactory as a way to capture an
egalitarian distinction between fundamental and special science laws
with respect to fact relativity. With that in hand, we may turn to con-
sidering how to make the distinction with respect to kind relativity.
72 relativizing to kinds and facts
3.4.2 Fundamental Laws and Kind Relativity
If the above is correct—that the defining interest of fundamental sci-
ence is an interest in systematizing all facts—then the BBSA cannot
properly distinguish fundamental from special science laws because
(according to the BBSA) every law set is determined relative to the set
of all facts. But we must still consider kind relativity since it is a part
of the relativity of the KFRA. At this point for the KFRA we have it that
the laws are special science laws at least if they are (K, F)-relative laws
for any K and any F ⊂ F . This leaves as candidates for the funda-
mental laws the laws of systems that are best relative to (K,F ) for any
K. These are precisely the laws of the BBSA. Answering completely the
egalitarian distinguishing desideratum for the KFRA involves providing
an answer to the desideratum on behalf of the BBSA (imperfect though
it may be compared to the full answer given by the KFRA).
So, how might the BBSA, and the kind-relative part of the KFRA, dis-
tinguish between the kinds of fundamental science and the kinds of
the special sciences? Of course, there are at least as many ways to pick
out a set of kinds for the fundamental laws as there are sets of kinds.
But two strategies in particular seem salient.
The first is to follow the BBSA’s treatment of other fields to the letter.
Let the fundamental laws be the laws of the system that is best relative
to the kinds that are treated as basic in actual fundamental science
practice. A consequence of this strategy is that the fundamental laws
become unstable. The kinds treated as basic in fundamental science
one hundred years ago are different from those treated as basic now,
and so the fundamental laws of nature (being identified with the laws
relative to the kinds treated as basic by fundamental science) must have
changed over the past hundred years. This change would be fine if we
were talking about laws as determined directly by a scientific field. Of
course the laws of fundamental science as a field15 have changed. But
no one engaged in fundamental science would—and in the interest of
paralleling scientific practice, no philosopher should—think that the
fundamental laws themselves have changed.
The second salient strategy is to follow Lewis (1983) and privilege
the true fundamental kinds. This suffers from the issue that, just like
the laws of Lewis (1983), the fundamental laws are made potentially
epistemically inaccessible.16 Compared to the strategy of making the
15 It might be more natural here to say “physics as a field”, but I want to avoid conflating
physics and fundamental science. Certainly it is the case that fundamental science is
carried out predominantly under the auspices of physics, but it is just as certain that lots
of physics is explicitly not fundamental.
16 For details on this issue, see where it is first raised in Chapter 3 of van Fraassen (1989).
It is also worth mentioning that this is precisely the issue that motivates the epistemic
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fundamental laws relative to the kinds treated as basic by fundamental
science, I am inclined to go this Lewisian route of privileging the true
fundamental kinds, and bite the bullet with regards to concerns about
inaccessibility. I suspect that it better parallels the attitude towards fun-
damental laws in scientific practice to prioritize (1) constancy in the
fundamental laws and the potentially unsuccessful search for the true
fundamental kinds, over (2) inconstancy in the fundamental laws and
a guarantee of epistemic accessibility.
In the next chapter I will argue that we can and should do without
language relativity. In its place I put a combination of fact relativity—
to deal with accommodating special science laws as discussed in this
chapter—and any needed competition relativity—to deal with the is-
sues surrounding language privileging/relativity discussed in the next
chapter. If no competition relativity is needed, then it will be enough
to distinguish fundamental and special science laws on the basis of
fact relativity as discussed earlier. If competition relativity is needed,
then we will be faced with answering the new question of which com-
petition function (comprised of measures of simplicity, strength, their
balance, etc.) are the ones that yield the fundamental laws and which
yield special science laws. Either way, the current question of how to
distinguish the fundamental from special science kinds will not need
to be answered. It will not, however, be entirely uninteresting. As will
be seen, using a particular competition function is tantamount to privi-
leging a particular class of languages. If distinguishing between funda-
mental and special science laws with regards to competition relativity
is needed, it may be best understood in terms of what kinds/languages
different fields are willing to entertain.
3.5 summary
The BBSA of Cohen and Callender (2009) makes a dramatic change to
Lewis’ BSA by allowing for a plurality of law sets each relative to the
set of kinds treated as basic in the respective best system competitions.
The egalitarian special science laws of the BBSA depend, because of
the BBSA’s kind relativity, on the law-directed interests that distinguish
different fields of science being captured by what kinds are treated
as basic in the various fields. But the interests (in general) of fields
go beyond what kinds are treated as basic. In particular, some fields
may be interested in only a subset of the facts that are available for
study. Accommodating such interests in a BSA-style view of laws may
accessibility desideratum of Cohen and Callender (2009) that is mentioned in footnote 6
of this chapter.
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be done by relativizing laws to subsets of the facts of the world. While
the kind relativity of the BBSA offers a certain degree of fact relativity
on its own, it cannot unproblematically relativize laws to facts with
great precision.
I introduced (in Section 3.2) the KFRA, which extends the BBSA with
fact relativity. With both kind and fact relativity at its disposal, the
KFRA can do the same good work as the BBSA and more beyond that. It
was proposed (in Section 3.3) that views like the BBSA and KFRA should
be able to make sense of interfield interactions. In an example of an
interfield interaction between physics and biology concerning insect
vision, it was found that the fact relativity of the KFRA was needed
to avoid having laws of common and simple kinds outcompeting the
laws of comparatively rare and complex kinds. Another desideratum
was developed (in Section 3.4) according to which an egalitarian dis-
tinction between fundamental and special science laws should be avail-
able. Fact relativity is required to capture the standard picture of the
fundamental laws as being exceptionless parts of a theory of every-
thing. There does not seem to be a similarly strong strategy for satis-
fying the desideratum with respect to kind relativity. Because both the
BBSA and KFRA feature kind relativity, neither satisfies the desideratum
without issue, but the KFRA benefits from the strength of the distin-
guishing allowed by fact relativity. Overall, if one is inclined towards
a relative laws view like the BBSA, it seems like it would be entirely
beneficial to adopt fact relativity and move to the KFRA.
Part II
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